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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/05/2006

Accident number: 151

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 25/08/1997

Where it occurred: Qalai Muslim, Ward 7,
Kabul
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Demolition accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: OZM-3 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
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An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for four years. He had last attended a revision course two
months before and had last been on leave 39 days before the accident. The ground at the
accident site was described as "grazing land: medium hard", meaning a rocky hillside.
Despite the fact the survey made of the site prior to clearance had indicated only the
presence of PMN mines, a wide range of fragmentation and bounding fragmentation mines
had been found. The demining group claimed to have identified the mine involved in the
accident as an OZM-3 by finding fragments of it.
The investigators determined that the deminer located a tripwire and informed his superiors.
Correct procedure required that the wire be pulled from a safe distance. The deminer pulled
the wire from 30 metres while in a standing position.
The Team Leader said that warnings were still being given to the third side (part of
procedure) when the mine exploded unexpectedly. He blamed the survey team for not
warning them what kinds of mine to expect.
The Section Leader suspected that the victim assumed that mine was not a bounding
fragmentation type.
The victim's partner stated that the order for "pulling" had been given prior to the explosion –
and this his partner was working properly. He said that the survey team should have warned
them about the kinds of mines to expect.
The victim said he was making the rope straight prior to pulling when he stumbled and pulled
the rope. He claimed he was in a squatting position when the rope was pulled. He said the
rope should be taken to the tripwire properly and straightened to avoid future accidents.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the deminer did not execute correct procedures when
pulling, did not maintain a proper safety distance from the device, and pulled while standing,
which was against procedure. They further commented that the Section Leader exhibited poor
command and control.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that deminers should not be allowed to pull a tripwire "or any
other object/obstacle" in a standing position, or be in too much of a hurry and ignore safety
distances. They added that the Section Leader concerned should be disciplined for his "poor
performance and control", and that survey teams should ensure that accurate information
about the mines and types of mines in a particular area was given.
[Correct procedure (dictated by the UN MAC) for the pulling or tripwires was that the wire
should not be pulled unless both ends had been located (and by implication the mine
identified). The pulling rope should then have been unrolled out to the tripwire, so avoiding
accidental detonation if it snagged or needed straightening. The tripwire should then have
been pulled from a distance of at least 50 metres (70 preferred) by a person who was prone
or behind cover. The procedure stated that the pulling of tripwires connected to a mine was
unsafe and time consuming, so should be avoided if possible.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 194

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes
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Compensation: 40,457 Rs

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: not recorded

Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Body
severe Leg
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as injuries to his right leg and the right side of body.
There were no photographs. A medic's sketch (vague) implied two penetrations one below
the knee and one on the upper thigh.
The demining group reported that the victim sustained injury to his right knee and right leg.
The victim had surgery and made a full recovery, returning to work on 15th December 1997.
The insurers made a compensation payment on 17th April 1988 of 40,457 Rs.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it seems
that the victim was not following SOPs and his error went uncorrected. His version of events
is considered "unsafe" because he claimed to have been "squatting", which seems to conflict
with his injuries.
It seems likely that the victim was unaware that he was in breach of SOPs as he carried out
an unfamiliar procedure, and so there may have been a training inadequacy. The secondary
cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
A UN MAC accident summary mentions another deminer injured in this accident. The
researcher could find no record of that individual in other files so has assumed that a mistake
was made.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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